Author: Salma El Bantaoui
Israel’s August 18 airstrikes on the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria were more than another episode in the long history of Israeli military operations on Syrian territory. Eight strikes reportedly hit the runway and storage facilities, without reported casualties. Israel argued that Damascus was close to allowing Turkish troops to deploy at the base, a development it considered a threat to its national security. Syria and Turkey, however, disputed that account, with Damascus denying plans for a permanent Turkish base and Ankara stating that no Turkish personnel were present at Abu al-Duhur at the time of the attack.
The disagreement reflects a deeper transformation in the geopolitical balance of post-Assad Syria. As Turkey expands its political and military cooperation with Syria’s new government, Israel increasingly views the possibility of a greater Turkish military presence as a challenge to its own security interests. The result is an emerging security dilemma in which actions intended by one side to strengthen its security may increase the insecurity of the other, creating conditions for escalation even without either state deliberately seeking direct confrontation.
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A New Balance of Power After Assad
The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 fundamentally altered Syria’s regional position. Under Assad, Iran and Hezbollah were critical allies of Damascus, while Syria provided Iran with an important route for supporting Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel, in turn, repeatedly carried out military operations in Syria aimed at constraining Iranian influence and weapons transfers. Assad’s collapse therefore represented a significant strategic setback for Tehran and disrupted a regional configuration that had shaped Israeli security calculations for years.
Yet the weakening of Iranian influence did not leave Syria geopolitically isolated. Turkey, which had backed elements of the Syrian opposition during the civil war, emerged as one of the most influential external actors in post-Assad Syria. This transformation created a paradox for Israel: the decline of Iranian influence reduced one longstanding source of insecurity, while the growing role of another powerful regional state introduced a different strategic uncertainty.
Turkey’s Strategic Interests
For Ankara, a stable and friendly government in Damascus serves several strategic interests. Most importantly, Turkey has long viewed the presence of Kurdish armed groups along its southern border through the lens of its conflict with the PKK. Ankara regards the YPG, which has played a leading role within the Syrian Democratic Forces, as linked to the PKK and has supported the integration of Kurdish-led forces into Syrian state structures rather than their continued existence as an autonomous armed actor.
Turkey’s relationship with the new Syrian authorities, however, extends beyond the Kurdish question. Ankara has supported military training and reconstruction while developing broader political and economic ties with Damascus. Economic interests are becoming increasingly visible as well: on August 19, Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar said Turkey was prepared to cooperate with Syria in exploring oil and gas resources.
Turkey’s growing role should therefore not simply be interpreted as an attempt to replace Iran. It reflects Ankara’s own security, political and economic interests. Nevertheless, from Israel’s perspective, the possibility of an expanded Turkish military presence at strategically significant Syrian facilities alters the security environment on its northern flank.
From Security Concern to Military Action
Israel’s concerns should not simply be dismissed as irrational. Turkey is a major regional military power, and relations between Ankara and Jerusalem are already strained. A deeper Turkish military presence in Syria could therefore reasonably feature in Israeli security calculations.
Recognising a security concern, however, is different from establishing that military action is necessary or legally justified.
In the Abu al-Duhur case, Israel maintained that Syria was preparing to permit Turkish troops to deploy at the airbase. Syria denied that a permanent Turkish base or deployment was planned, while Turkey stated that no Turkish personnel were present at the base before or during the strike. Publicly available information therefore establishes the existence of Israeli concern, but does not establish that an imminent Turkish or Syrian armed attack against Israel was being prepared.
The timing is also significant. Four days before the strikes, Mossad chief Roman Gofman and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani reportedly discussed Israel’s concerns regarding Turkish military deployments, weapons sales and drones. Diplomatic communication concerning precisely the issue that later contributed to the strike therefore existed before force was used.
An Emerging Security Dilemma
This is where the concept of the security dilemma becomes particularly useful. Israel may regard action against infrastructure that could facilitate a Turkish deployment as defensive – an attempt to prevent a future threat from materialising. Turkey, however, can interpret the same action as evidence that Israel is prepared to use force to restrict Turkish interests and Syrian defence cooperation.
Ankara may consequently conclude that it needs stronger security arrangements or deeper military cooperation with Damascus. Israel could then interpret that response as confirmation of its original fear, prompting further action.
The danger is a cycle of action, reaction and increasing mistrust. Neither Israel nor Turkey necessarily needs to desire a direct war for confrontation to become possible. If each side increasingly interprets the other’s defensive measures as evidence of hostile intentions, policies intended to produce greater security may instead leave both states less secure.
Syrian Sovereignty and International Law
The rivalry raises a separate question: what happens to Syrian sovereignty when competing regional powers pursue their security interests on Syrian territory?
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter establishes a general prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, while Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs. The scope of anticipatory self-defence remains debated, but arguments supporting it generally place considerable weight on the imminence of the threatened attack, as well as necessity and proportionality.
It would therefore be premature to make a categorical legal judgment without access to the intelligence on which Israel based its decision. Yet the publicly available evidence raises an important distinction. A potential future Turkish military presence may constitute a genuine strategic concern for Israel, but a strategic concern is not necessarily equivalent to an imminent armed attack.
Where diplomatic communication remains possible and the alleged deployment itself is contested, the use of military force raises particularly difficult questions concerning necessity, Syrian sovereignty and the limits of self-defence.
Syria and the Cost of Regional Competition
There is also a danger in analysing the confrontation exclusively through Israeli and Turkish interests. Syria is not merely the geographical space separating two regional powers.
Its population has already endured more than a decade of civil war that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions. Renewed external military escalation could place additional pressure on Syrian institutions, infrastructure and civilians at a moment when the country is attempting to rebuild its political and security structures.
The pursuit of Israeli or Turkish security should therefore be considered alongside Syria’s sovereign right to determine its own political and security future. If Syrian territory repeatedly becomes the arena in which external powers act against potential future threats, the country’s post-war transition risks being shaped less by Syrians themselves than by the competing security calculations of neighbouring states.
Can Diplomacy Break the Cycle?
The American response to the Abu al-Duhur strikes illustrates both the danger and a possible way forward. U.S. envoy Tom Barrack described the Israeli action as an “unnecessary escalation” and said Washington was working on a deconfliction and information-sharing mechanism among Israel, Turkey and Syria. Turkey had not been informed about the strike, and Barrack warned that Ankara could have responded militarily.
Such a mechanism cannot eliminate the competing interests of Ankara and Jerusalem. It can, however, address one of the central forces driving a security dilemma: uncertainty. Direct communication can reduce the likelihood that military movements are automatically interpreted as preparations for attack and provide alternatives to immediate military action.
Ultimately, the emerging Israeli-Turkish rivalry demonstrates how the pursuit of security can paradoxically generate greater insecurity. Israel has understandable reasons to monitor changes in its regional security environment, while Turkey has genuine interests concerning its border and Syria’s future. Neither, however, is likely to achieve lasting security through an escalating cycle of military action and reaction.
Diplomacy, direct communication and negotiation therefore offer more than an idealistic alternative to force: they are practical mechanisms for preventing misperception from becoming confrontation. The UN Charter itself requires members to settle international disputes by peaceful means. Most importantly, the competing security interests of Ankara and Jerusalem should not come at the expense of Syria’s sovereignty or expose its population to another cycle of regional violence.
Breaking the security dilemma requires restraint from both sides. Lasting security will depend not on attempting to eliminate every possible future threat through force, but on managing competing interests before fear becomes a self-fulfilling conflict.
Author Bio
Salma El Bantaoui is an undergraduate student of Political Science and International Relations at the University of the Peloponnese in Greece. Her academic interests include geopolitics, international law, human rights, migration and Middle Eastern security, with a particular interest in the interaction between state security and regional competition.
Sources
Reuters, 18 Aug 2026. Eight Israeli airstrikes hit Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase, no casualties, state TV says. Link
Reuters, 20 Aug 2026. Syria says no Turkish military build-up planned at airbase struck by Israel. Link
Reuters, 19 Aug 2026. Mossad director, Syria foreign minister discussed Turkish military deployments. Link
Reuters, 18 Aug 2026. US working on deconfliction mechanism among Turkey, Israel, Syria, US envoy says. Link
Reuters, 19 Aug 2026. Turkey is ready to search for oil and gas in Syria, Turkish minister says. Link
Reuters, 13 Aug 2025. Syrian Kurdish YPG should stop delaying Syria integration, Turkey says. Link
Reuters, 9 Dec 2024. Assad’s exit shatters Iran’s influence, risks Islamists’ rise in Syria. Link
United Nations. Charter of the United Nations – Full text. Link
Chatham House. Principles of International Law on the Use of Force by States in Self-Defence. Link
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